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Summary: The goal of this article is to show that instrumental rationality and
utility that have been used in economics for many years does not work well. What
is presented in the article is how significant the influence of utilitarianism has
been on economics and why the economists get rid of humans’ goals and moti-
vations. It is shown in the article that the human who decides in present is abso-
lutely different from the human who decides over time. Many economists ne-
glected this problem because they wanted to have an effective and simple 
model. Becker’s economic method is presented as a dead end to which econom-
ics has been brought to. It is impossible to connect different selves of one human
being by using the utility measure. The works of Schelling and Mill are used to 
explain this impossibility. The conclusion of this article is that instrumental ration-
ality and utility have affected economics significantly. But, this simplified view on
human nature is no longer valid. Hence, economics needs to think not only about
the means but also about the human goals. Economics needs to rebuff relativism
and show people how to achieve well-being. If we want to help people with their 
self-governance, we will have to choose reason over emotions.
Key words: Instrumental rationality, Utilitarianism, Choice over time, Multiple
selves, Well-being.
JEL: B00, B40, B50, D91.
 
 
 
 
 
 
“What a piece of work is a man! How noble in reason!  
How infinite in faculties!” 
 
Hamlet 
 
Neoclassical economics focuses on measures and not on ends which human beings put 
on themselves. Due to this narrow understanding of rationality, economics has a 
problem with duality of humans when they must choose between now and the future. 
This article shows the great influence utilitarianism has on economics and the strong 
connection between utilitarian thinking and instrumental rationality. This 
conglomerate caused economics to no longer be interested in motivations and goals of 
humans; the only area it is interested in is the choice. Moreover, what people choose 
is always rational because if it is not, then they would not choose it. In this article, the 
author shows the duality of humans in accordance with time. The author also 
demonstrates that people want something different when they choose now unlike with 
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the later choice. The author also argues that these differences are not solely any simple 
anomalies and that this inconsistency of choice is an integral part of human nature. 
Becker’s ideas have been used in this article as an example of pushing instrumental 
rationality and utilitarianism to extremes. He is presented as a warning for many 
economists to be careful while using the economic approach. This problem is 
illustrated by the example of drugs, but most notably, it shows when a person has a 
choice between the short-term temptations and the long-term benefits. 
The second part of this article places an emphasis on Mill’s trials to reconcile 
human’s different selves. Trials where he used utilitarianism reasoning failed to 
explain the human duality. Therefore, Schelling’s thoughts have been used to show 
why this failure occurred. He mentioned about the human dualism and the fact that it 
is impossible to compare choices over time, if the utilitarian measures are only used. 
This is the reason why the notion of second-order desires (Harry G. Frankfurt 1971) 
has been introduced here. The author also attempts to underline the difference between 
human’s goals, values, and choices. These differences have been emphasized because 
economics as a science needs to study human’s motivations and goals, if economists 
want to know the people and predict their behaviors better. 
Of course, over the last years neoclassical economics has tried to refer to the 
criticism toward homo economicus. We can observe the process of “reverse 
imperialism” where economics tries to use knowledge from psychology and sociology. 
However, these are only some adjustments to the main theory and not its rebuttal or a 
significant change. The author will show that if we are still using the economic 
approach, it will be impossible for economics to understand complex reality. 
 
1. The Origins of the Problem 
 
Economics is the social science that is derived mostly from utilitarianism. We can even 
say that Bentham was one of the fathers of the contemporary economics. Certainly, he 
is regarded as the founder of utilitarianism. Nowadays, this ethical system is very 
prominent, especially in the corridors of universities of economics. 
In Bentham’s opinion, human always seeks to maximize utility, and this is 
because: “Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, 
pain and pleasure” (Jeremy Bentham 1823). Moreover, Bentham underlines that 
pleasure and pain are not only our empirical “masters” but they also define how we 
should behave: “It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to 
determine what we shall do” (Bentham 1823). This accentuation is crucial because 
very often utilitarianism is discerned solely as a system that describes human behavior. 
Bentham finds the maximization of utility as an end itself; therefore, he criticizes the 
Greek philosophers who believe that some pleasures depreciate human being. The 
English philosopher scoffs at their searching for the highest good (summum bonum) 
and claims that this is the “consummate nonsense”. In his opinion, searching for 
something better and different from pleasure does not have any sense, as it is 
impossible to be found. Plato, with his realm of ideas, is for Bentham “the master 
manufacturer of nonsense” (Amnon Goldworth 1983, pp. 134-147). 
Bentham’s idea has achieved a noticeable place in economics today due to the 
marginal revolution in the early 1870s. Jevons, Menger, and Walras underline the 
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importance of utility (Ivan Moscati 2013). The notion of revolution is not an accident 
because the primary interest of economics shifted at that time from production of 
wealth to utility, which is gained from consumption. Utility in utilitarianism has two 
dimensions, namely, duration and intensity of pleasure (or pain). Although 
marginalists were interested in human motivations and in counting their satisfaction, 
since the 1930s, the mainstream economics has restricted their research field. 
Consequently, the understanding of utility as happiness started to be considered as 
something that is impossible to be measured objectively; therefore, it should be taken 
away from economics. 
Economists stopped being interested in human motivations, and they assumed 
a priori that human is always rational and that he/she always maximizes his/her utility. 
Moreover, many economists started to understand rationality in a narrower sense than 
the father of economics Adam Smith. They established that the agent uses the 
instrumental rationality. In other words, every person makes use of knowledge and 
he/she uses logical deduction to use means effectively (Janina Godłów-Legiędź 2013). 
The conglomeration of utility and rationality is evident in the works of Paul A. 
Samuelson (1938, 1948) who went away from the indifference curve to the revealed 
preference. According to him, human behaves rationally but rationality is treated 
instrumentally, because economics does not know and does not want to know which 
motivations every human being is driven by. Neoclassical economists are solely 
interested in the results but not in the causes of this behavior. This simplified model of 
a man is also used by macroeconomics. It was Milton Friedman (1953) who claims 
that human motivations do not matter in the economic analysis. What matters is 
predictive power. Due to this theory, along with ridding of the psychological baggage, 
the economists thought that they were going to make economics the most scientific 
among the social sciences. They believe that the goal of economics should be the focus 
on human choices, and that they are sufficient to predict the agent’s future behavior. 
Mainstream economics focuses on human choices, and it restricts the understanding of 
rationality because it considers Hume’s words that: “Reason is, and ought only to be 
the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and 
obey them” (David Hume 2003, p. 415) very seriously. It basically means that we 
cannot rationally choose our desires. Economists have eagerly accepted this idea 
believing that human preferences are given. The only rational thing for a human being 
is to satisfy these needs. Moreover, neoclassical economics focuses on the agent’s 
choices because we cannot detail our motivations. Therefore, economists have the 
“allergy” to human resolutions, and they do not give any credit to this kind of 
statement. Ultimately, it is your deeds, not your words that matter most. 
Finally, to take a clearer description of the utilitarian economics, it must be 
stated that there is no distinction between better and worse pleasures. Bentham wrote: 
“Prejudice apart, the game of push-pin1 is of equal value with the arts and sciences of 
music and poetry” (Bentham 1830, p. 206). In his opinion, both activities are equally 
good if they give the same amount of utility. 
 
1 The game for children that was popular in Bentham’s times. 
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Economics wants to be a positive science and does not want to value deeds; 
therefore, utilitarianism comes in handy. This way of thinking favors the hedonistic 
approach where we are driven by the short-term spurs, and we want to receive 
pleasures as soon as possible. Can we think of any other faster pleasure than buying 
consumer goods? The nature of economics encourages the adoption of utilitarian 
premises by marginalists who focus on the person’s choices of different material 
goods. We can hear the echo of these thoughts in Samuelson who writes that: “As a 
customer you will buy a good because you feel it gives you satisfaction or ‘utility’” 
(Samuelson 1980, p. 48). 
We must be careful not to be taken by this oversimplified picture where 
economics is only concerned with people who consume a sausage or drink Coca-Cola. 
Not every purchase of the consumer’s goods is so easy to be made and people are more 
likely to follow their values. But, the most essential thing is that economics uses the 
concept of homo economicus not only to describe the action on the market but also to 
characterize the whole human nature. 
Although there has been a lot of criticism toward the economic man for many 
years, this model is still in use. This situation is possible because homo economicus 
has made economics the most important discipline of the social sciences. However, 
both the concentration on the process of choice and the elimination of the other values 
caused that homo economicus has a big problem to describe the reality and to predict 
human behavior in the future. In the next chapter, it will be shown that human beings 
cannot maximize their own utility and the primary cause of this fact is decisions made 
in the future. 
 
2. Man over Time 
 
“There is no quality in human nature, which causes more fatal errors in our 
conduct, than which leads us to prefer whatever is present to the distant and 
remote.” 
 
Hume (2003, Section VII) 
 
It is true that neoclassical economists focus on human choices in a particular moment. 
However, they know that choices now and choices in the future differentiate from each 
other quite significantly. More than one hundred years ago, Jevons, one of the fathers 
of marginal revolution, wrote:  
 
“To secure a maximum of benefit in life, all future events, all future pleasures or 
pains, should act upon us with the same force as if they were present, allowance 
being made for their uncertainty. The factor expressing the effect of remoteness 
should, in short, always be unity, so that time should have no influence. But no 
human mind is constituted in this perfect way: a future feeling is always less 
influential than a present one” (William S. Jevons 1911, pp. 72-73). 
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Economists handle the problem of different human choices being dependent on 
the time when the choice was made2. For a man/woman, now is more important than 
later, and this is why he/she discounts future utility. It was Samuelson (1937) who 
introduced the discounted utility model. Reference to the financial market is not 
presented by accident. In the neoclassical economics, every human being can assess 
and enumerate utility that he/she would receive in the future. In his short paper (seven 
pages long), Samuelson (1937) spends two of the last pages to indicate some possible 
problems with his model that he calls “serious limitations”. One of his concerns is, if 
people discount future at rates that vary over time then they may change their minds 
as time moves forward. Therefore, it bothered Samuelson (1937) that people might 
display time inconsistency. He was aware that such a behavior exists. For example, he 
writes about purchasing total life insurance as a compulsory savings measure. But, he 
does not develop these problems with inconsistency and he just moves on. Economists 
followed his suit, and his discounted utility model became a standard model of 
intertemporal choice. Franco Modigliani (1966) is the best example of implementing 
discounted utility model. He based his model on an individual’s total income, and his 
theory is called life cycle hypothesis. In this theory, people are rational, and they are 
able to make a plan when they are young regarding how to smoothen their consumption 
over their lifetime. Furthermore, this hypothesis not only assumes that people are able 
to make all calculations (with rational expectations) about how long they will live, how 
much they will make, and so on, but also possesses self-control, which is necessary if 
people want to apply the optimal plan. 
It is not surprising that with time economics dealt with the increasing number 
of cases which show that human beings cannot discount future utility at all. Indeed, 
people try to discount future utility, but it does not work very well for them. Moreover, 
the complications with discounting utility are not only the ordinary anomalies but they 
also indicate a systematic problem which makes that the foundations of homo 
economicus - long-term preference - cannot be fulfilled. 
The problem with the evaluation of the future is called present bias or 
hyperbolic discounting. Concededly, in this theory, human can discount future utility, 
but when it comes to the moment of choice, he/she does not stick to his/her preferences. 
For example, when we give people choice between 7 hours of unpleasant activity on 1 
April and 8 hours on 15 April and ask them on 1 February, almost everyone chooses 7 
hours on 1 April. However, when it comes to 1 April, people having the same choice 
in the majority postpone this unpleasant activity on 15 April (Ted O’Donoghue and 
Rabin 1999). This time inconsistency is very important because it hits everyone and 
renders that we do not maximize our long-term preferences. We do not maximize them 
because we are “too much” focused at present. All along, we want some choice more 
than the other, but when selection arrives, then our preferences will change, and we 
will delay any decision that is unpleasant for us. 
The other side of this problem is that humans should wait but they make a 
decision now because their choice is associated with the instant pleasure. O’Donoghue 
 
2 Loewenstein shows how psychological perspective of Senior, Jevons, and Bohm-Bawerek was brought 
to the formulation of discounted utility by Samuelson (George Loewenstein 1992, pp. 3-35). The process 
of removing psychology from economics is well-described by Luigino Bruni and Robert Sugden (2007). 
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and Rabin (1999) called this problem “preproperate”, which they derived it from the 
Latin root “prat-pruperum” which means “to do before the proper time”. To illustrate 
this issue, the following example is used. People can choose $100 in 30 days or $105 
in 31 days. The majority of them choose the second option. But, if we must choose 
between $100 today and $105 tomorrow almost everyone will pick the first option. 
The difference between the choices is not a problem for economics because discounted 
utility model assumes that future is less important than the present for people. 
Therefore, waiting one day after thirty days to get $5 is easier than waiting one day 
from today. However, as it turned out, people are time inconsistent. They opt for $105 
in 31 days but when the 30th day passes and they have the choice between $100 now 
and $105 tomorrow, they will switch their preferences to $100 now. This behavior is 
inconsistent with the long-term preferences, and it means that we pay too much 
attention to the present time. The economists were not interested in the problem of 
time inconsistency to the 1980s with one praiseworthy exception of Robert H. Strotz 
(1955). However, it was George Ainslie (1975), a psychologist, who introduced the 
idea of hyperbolic discounting. Richard H. Thaler and Hersh M. Shefrin (1981) 
implemented this idea into economics. It gained currency with time and some 
economics created the models of dynamically inconsistent time preferences (David 
Laibson 1997; O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999, 2001). It will not be elaborated on how 
these models work because they face the same problems as the static models. Later, it 
will be shown that it is impossible to compare decisions over time exclusively by using 
utility measurements. 
Fisher gives a vivid example of the combination of procrastination and 
“preproperate”. He writes:  
 
“This is illustrated by the story of the farmer who would never mend his leaky roof. 
When it rained he could not stop the leak, and when it did not rain there was no leak 
to be stopped! Among such persons, the preference for present gratification is 
powerful because their anticipation of the future is weak” (Irving Fisher 1930, p. 
81).  
 
It is important to underline that present-bias touches every human being. Even 
more “sophisticated” people who know about the problem with procrastination cannot 
properly assess its influence on them (Strotz 1955). This is because the future choice 
will always be present in the future. This present bias makes human to be a 
personification of utilitarianism where person seeks for an instant pleasure and flees 
from any kind of botheration. 
The other problem with discounting future utility is that human beings have the 
amazing ability to adapt to any changes. Phillip Brickman, Dan Coates, and Ronnie 
Janoff-Bulman (1978) interviewed people who have won the lottery over the last year 
(average winnings of $479,545) and the control group. Researchers have not found any 
difference in reported happiness between winners and non-winners. A more expressive 
example is that people who won big lotteries after few years felt happiness similar to 
the people who had met with an accident and had to use a wheelchair till the end of 
their lives (Brickman, Coates, and Janoff-Bulman 1978). This research shows how 
relative utility can be and how non-intuitive the output of this analysis is for many 
people. It is hard for a man/woman to access the future flow of happiness (Daniel T. 
 639 Human Now versus Human over Time. When Instrumental Rationality and Utility Are Not Enough 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2019, Vol. 66, Issue 5, pp. 633-657
Gilbert 2007). Moreover, people very often do not have any idea about how much 
happiness the particular situation could give them. Thus, they think they know but they 
are mistaken. 
This phenomenon is called “focus illusion” and it was introduced by Daniel 
Kahneman and David A. Schkade (1998). It can be summarized by the maxim: 
“Nothing in life matters quite as much as you think it does while you are thinking about 
it” (Kahneman and Schkade 1998). It means that we have the tendency to exaggerate 
the importance of any aspect of our life when we focus our attention on it. Kahneman 
and Schkade (1998) performed the experiment where a lot of students from Midwest 
and from Southern California rated their overall life satisfaction as well as various 
aspects of life, for either themselves or someone similar to them in one of these two 
regions. It can be concluded that this self-reported life satisfaction was the same in 
these two regions, but the participants who rated another group expected Californians 
to be more satisfied than Midwesterners. It means that people intuitively (wrongly) 
assume that life in California must be better because they focus their attention on one 
factor (weather). It is wrong because people forget that weather is not the only thing 
that influences our life satisfaction. What are also important are job, family, social 
connections, and many other factors. 
Another problem with decisions over time is when we make a decision in a hot 
state, for example, buying automobiles when the dealer has them excited, getting 
married in the heat of passion, or committing suicide in the depth of depression 
(Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Matthew Rabin 2000). This hot state results from the 
present-bias. Furthermore, we cannot understand that the state of arousal will pass 
quickly and our decisions will be seen as something irrational. 
The aforementioned examples are only some of the many other problems 
connected with the maximization of utility in the future. However, they are very 
symptomatic, and they show that there is a gap between human now and human in the 
future. It can be easily observed that there are two absolutely different selves of human 
that want something different. Jon Elster (1986) presents more conceptions of multiple 
self. However, the majority of them have not been formalized. 
Economics as a science focuses on the process of choice, and it only describes 
the “present human” who is at the mercy of his/her desires and weaknesses. Moreover, 
economics answers the critics of homo economicus by rejecting the possibility of the 
existence of two selves (self now and self over time). Economics defends rationality 
and the maximization of homo economicus and makes that economics is now in the 
cul-de-sac. 
 
3. The Defense of homo economicus - On the Road to Tautology 
 
“Never let the truth get in the way of a good story.” 
 
Mark Twain 
 
Obviously, neoclassical economists have known about the human problem with the 
maximization of utility in the long-run. However, they did not want to discard the 
model of homo economicus because it was so effective; they only adjusted it because 
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of the rising criticism. Neoclassical economists have admitted that human is not hyper-
rational and does not always maximize his/her own utility, but they do not change the 
core of homo economicus at all. A human being still maximizes his/her own utility and 
is rational. 
Neoclassical economists being focused on the agent in the process of choice 
needed to deal with the problem concerning a big gap between a man choosing now 
and a man who will choose in the future. To rebut the criticism from the other social 
sciences (especially from psychology), economists have used an instrumental 
understanding of rationality. Alright - they said - human in the long-run do not pick 
the best option but it does not mean that he is not rational and that he does not seek to 
maximize his utility. The problems with the maximization of utility exist because 
according to the neoclassical economists, costs of acquisition and processing of 
information can be too high. Thus, as Knight had noticed much earlier: “It is evident 
that the rational thing to do is to be irrational, where deliberation and estimation cost 
more than they are worth” (Frank H. Knight 1921, p. 67, footnote 14). Heuristics - the 
simple and efficient rules which people often use to form the judgments and to make 
decisions - exist because people do not have enough time to digest every available 
information. If we need to think about our every move, we will not be able to live 
because every day we must make thousands of different decisions. 
It is of great importance to mention that we can derive two implications from 
the knowledge, that people are weak and that they are not always absolutely rational. 
First, human according to Simon was seeking satisfaction not maximization: “Whereas 
economic man maximizes - selects the best alternative from among all those available 
to him, his cousin, administrative man, satisfices - looks for a course of action that is 
satisfactory or ‘good enough’” (Herbert A. Simon 1947, p. XXIX). The bounded 
rationality exists because human has cognitive constraints which was the second of 
Simon’s conclusions. Nevertheless, Simon’s idea was only an attempt to adjust homo 
economicus to reality and not to rebut it. Simon did not polemicize with the assumption 
that people are driven by their instrumental rationality and they always want to 
maximize their own utility. However, due to the complexity of the external world, they 
cannot always maximize their own utility. Neoclassical economics could easily deal 
with Simon’s criticism. The World is too complex, and we cannot process every piece 
of information; therefore, rationality in an economic sense is different from common 
sense rationality. This “clash” between economic rationality (process) and common 
sense rationality (outputs) is presented by John Conlisk (1996, p. 690):  
 
“When I walked into a post while watching a bird, my family called it a dumb move. 
Among economists, however, I could have claimed that, given the spatial 
distribution of lamp posts, the expected utility of bird watching exceeded the 
expected disutility of a collision. Ex ante, the post probably was not there, and it is 
entirely rational to collide with an ex post post. This example illustrates the 
confounding of rationality issues with information issues. Am I dumb to walk into 
a post or merely a rational victim of imperfect information?” 
 
Homo economicus has been changing because of its incongruity to reality but 
economists made only changes in auxiliary hypotheses of the model, whereas the “hard 
core” of homo economicus remains the same (Imre Lakatos 1980). All advantages and 
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disadvantages of economic model are incarnated in the works of Becker, who has 
driven the economic analysis to the dead end. Becker’s ideas will be discussed to show 
that homo economicus is worn out. 
 
3.1 Becker 
 
“An economist by training thinks of himself as the guardian of rationality, 
the ascriber of rationality to others, and the prescriber of rationality to the 
social word.” 
 
(Kenneth J. Arrow 1974, p. 16) 
 
Becker’s view of rationality has given economics the opportunity to study many fields 
that had yet been covered by the other social sciences. He did not hide that; thanks to 
his method, it is possible to explain about the overall human behavior and that every 
field in social sciences should use this approach. The term economic imperialism 
consummately shows this lack of humility. Becker pushed the underpinnings of 
neoclassical economics to the extreme. The main premises of Becker’s economic 
approach are maximizing behavior, market equilibrium, and stable preferences (Garry 
Becker 1978, p. 5). He did not hide how much he derived from utilitarianism and from 
Bentham. For Nobel prize-winner, it was also important that human beings always 
seek to maximize their utility. Moreover, he used “relativity” of utility and made that 
this term started to be the “black box” which could contain everything. Therefore, it 
does not matter if a man/woman is an altruist or an egoist because no matter what 
he/she will always maximize his/her utility (Amartya Sen 1977, 1999). 
By broadened conception of utility, Becker answered two different kinds of 
critics of the homo economicus. First, he embraced all the altruistic behaviors into the 
process of maximization. Even if a man/woman has regard for others, he/she cares for 
them because in the end it gives him/her utility. In philosophy, this kind of reasoning 
is called psychological egoism. Second, the extended conception of utility causes that 
we cannot establish any objective values which human beings want to pursue. It is 
impossible to compare utility between people and also between any choices made by 
the particular person. 
Consequently, Becker has come to tautology, and his theory is vastly 
impractical because it is impossible to explain why some behaviors are different from 
others and how to choose the better one. Hence, if a woman hugs her child, we can say 
that she does it because she gets utility from hugging. However, if she does not hug 
her child, we can say that this is because she derives utility from non-hugging (Tomas 
Sedlacek 2009, p. 225). 
Becker does not seem as somebody who was bothered about tautology because 
he thought that his model was good enough to predict the future human behavior. In 
addition, there is no sense to be bothered by human motivation and as he co-wrote with 
Stigler “no significant behavior has been illuminated by assumptions of differences in 
tastes” (Becker and George Stigler 1977). Motivations do not matter because we 
cannot test them. Moreover, they caused “endless degrees of freedom” (Becker and 
Stigler 1977). 
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The antipathy to understand human motives is clearly visible when we look at 
the title of one of the most important Becker’s articles “De Gustibus Non Est 
Disputandum” (Latin. There is No Accounting for Tastes). In this article Becker 
underlines the meaning of stable preferences: “...(O)ne does not argue over tastes for 
the same reason one does not argue over the Rocky Mountains - both are there, will be 
there the next year, too, and are the same to all men” (Becker and Stigler 1977). Becker 
was aware that he simplified reality by assuming that the stable preferences exist. 
However, this simplification was necessary because he did not want to be tangled in 
the infeasible analysis of human motivation. Therefore, in Becker’s model, people 
behave in accordance with instrumental rationality, and they choose only means not 
the ends. This is why the only important thing for Becker is a choice which takes place 
at the very moment. For him, this choice is the foundation of his whole theory because 
this gives us all the necessary information. The other implication of the stable 
preferences is that external environment influences our actions and Becker emphasizes 
this statement by saying that: “The application of the economic approach so conceived 
are as extensive as the scope of economics in the definition … that emphasizes scarce 
means and competing ends” (Becker 1978, p. 8). Therefore, he started to be the 
successor of Lionel Robbins and his broad understanding of economics, demonstrated 
in the famous sentence: “Economics is the science which studies human behavior as a 
relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses” (Lionel 
Robbins 1932, p. 16). Becker also underlines the meaning of time: “Different 
constraints are decisive for different situations, but the most fundamental constraint is 
limited time” (Becker 1993). It was the scarcity of time that gave Becker the 
opportunity to explain seemingly irrational human actions in a short period of time. 
The most spectacular attempt in using this way of thinking is visible on the example 
of different addiction which he eagerly analyzed. 
 
3.2 The Problem with Rational Addiction  
 
In A Theory of Rational Addiction, Becker and Murphy claim that:  
 
“Yet, as the title of our paper indicates, we claim that addictions, even strong ones, 
are usually rational in the sense of involving forward-looking maximization with 
stable preferences. Our claim is even stronger: a rational framework permits new 
insights into addictive behavior” (Becker and Kevin M. Murphy 1988, p. 675). 
 
Becker pushes the economic approach with respect to the topic of drugs to its 
extreme. Due to this subject area, we can see what Becker means by rationality and 
how neoclassical economics views the world. Drugs are the best example of the 
conflict between those human beings who want the long-term goals and those human 
beings who choose here and now and who have the restricted cognitive abilities. 
First, it is necessary to admit that Becker is generally right when he shows that 
taking drugs is not contradictory to rationality. He condignly underlines that your 
deeds, not your words that matter most. People can declare (or even believe) that they 
want to live healthily and long, but these goals are not absolute because the alternative 
costs always appear in our life. Therefore, if you choose something, it means that you 
will turn away something else. This lack of absolute values cause that pleasure from 
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smoking in a short-term could be greater than possible unpleasantness from cancer in 
the future. 
This relativity interrelated with the absence of interest in human motivation 
caused that the only important thing is a choice which must be rational because it was 
not be chosen otherwise. Becker claims that humans somehow enumerate their long-
term goals (e.g. health) in comparison with the short-term pleasures (e.g. smoking). 
We do not know how they do it (we are not interested in motivations), but we simply 
assume that they can do this. Milton Friedman gives a famous example of an expert 
billiard player to illustrate the as if argument (1953, p. 21). 
Becker and Murphy use instrumental rationality to resolve the problem with 
different human actions which depend on time when they are made. “This paper relies 
on a weak concept of rationality that does not rule out strong discounts of future events. 
The consumers in our model become more and more myopic as time preference for 
the present (a) gets larger” (Becker and Murphy 1988, p. 683). According to Becker, 
present-bias is not a problem because there is no objective measure of utility. If we ask 
Becker about what is better - being healthy or not, he would probably answer that it 
depends on the utility that we gain from each condition. Moreover, Becker and Stigler 
use utility to explain the addictions: 
 
“Tastes are frequently said to change as a result of consuming certain ‘addictive’ 
goods. For example, smoking of cigarettes, drinking alcohol, injection of heroin, or 
close contact with some persons over an appreciable period of time, often increases 
the desire (creates a craving) for these goods or persons, and thereby cause their 
consumption to grow over time. In utility language, their marginal utility is said to 
rise over time because tastes shift in their favor” (Becker and Stigler 1977, pp. 77-
78). 
 
However, this understanding of rationality causes that it is easy to come to some 
absurd conclusions. Imagine the situation where, owing to the shipwreck a man lies on 
a small boat in the middle of the ocean, and he thinks about drinking water from the 
sea. He knows that he should not drink this water and it can only make him feel bad. 
Despite this knowledge, he succumbs to the temptation and drinks it. He gets sick and 
dies afterwards. Is it reasonable to say that this person behaves rationally? Is impulse, 
second utility enough to call some behavior rational? Let us move to the next example 
which was presented by Schelling:  
 
“Usually scratching is thought to be dysfunctional. Whether it is hives, chicken pox, 
mosquito bites, or poison ivy, doctors worry about infection; and most of us, 
especially parents, have observed that any momentary frenzied relief from 
scratching is followed almost instantly by enhanced itching. Many of us learn to 
resist the temptation to scratch. But not in our sleep” (Thomas C. Schelling 1996, 
p. 64). 
 
Is scratching during the dream a rational behavior?  
The aforementioned examples cause the question, if there should not be any 
difference between the reason and the biological needs, between consciousness with 
the long-term goals and simple pleasures? Obviously, the prior examples are extreme, 
but the questions resulted from them, concerns every human behavior. These questions 
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call up the ghosts of Bentham’s critics when people ask if it is possible to compute 
everything by using utility or if there are some differences between both values and 
pleasures. Becker like Bentham answers that it is impossible to distinguish between 
human motivations. 
This cut-off from human motivations and the narrow understanding of 
rationality causes that economics to dump the tools which were needed to answer the 
dilemma between human now and human over the time. It is observable that human 
beings have two selves that have different mechanisms and goals. The economic 
approach is uncomplicated and effective. However, it tells us only about doer while 
planner is ignored, using the terminology from Thaler and Shefrin (1981). 
The next part of this article will present about the second self of human beings. 
 
4. John S. Mill - Two Selves of Human Nature 
 
“Rationality is not only about maximizing;  
it is also about reflecting on what to maximize.”  
 
(Cyrlin Hédoin 2013) 
 
The problem of dualism of the human nature was very important to John S. Mill (1806-
l873). He tried to answer criticism of utilitarianism which in his times was called as 
the “pig philosophy”. Mill was a person who differed higher pleasures from the lower 
ones with regard to quality, not using only quantity or intensity. He admits that  
“… some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others” (John 
S. Mill 1879). However, very often we choose “lower” pleasures. Sometimes we prefer 
lying on the couch and watching comedy to reading Shakespeare. We crave for 
undemanding intellectual activities, even if we do not set great store on them. At first 
sight, it looks contradictory to Mill’s theory when people want higher pleasures which 
are connected with intellect not with the trivial thrills. However, Mill answers this 
critic and the difference between human choosing between the short-term and the long-
term perspective. It is true that we prefer lying on the couch and watching a comedy 
to reading Shakespeare because this less demanding activity can give us more pleasure. 
However, people value Shakespeare more and it is not only because they are taught to 
have a respect to the classic. As far as Mill is concerned, the “true” choice is in the 
long-term perspective when our preferences are changed and people look for these 
things that are more valuable than the simple pleasures. Despite wanting to lie on the 
couch and watch a comedy, if somebody asks us what we want to do in our whole life, 
the majority will choose to read Shakespeare or choose to do other meaningful 
activities Mill explains that we choose the “lower” pleasures even if we want the higher 
ones because “… occasionally, under the influence of temptation, postpone them to 
the lower” (Mill 1879). Thus, it means that we know the difference between comedy 
and Shakespeare, but sometimes we succumb to our weaknesses. We find Hamlet a 
great play not because we like it more than the other pleasures but because it challenges 
us and makes us a better person. 
Thus, Mill unknowingly departed from utilitarianism because he assumed that 
there exist more “worthy” deeds. However, Mill’s credit for human’s higher needs 
created the problem. Economists do not like the human declarations because very often 
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they do not coincide with the real choices. For example, Americans ranked highest, 
“talking with children” and seventeenth, “watching television”, while it seems clear 
that in practice most Americans spend much more time watching TV than they ever 
do talking to their children (Thomas F. Juster 1985). When people are asked which 
programs they want to watch on TV, they point out performances, theater, or opera but 
when it comes to choice, they watch soap operas. 
However, these results do not mean that people are hypocrites and that their 
declarations are only the way to look better in the eyes of others. The majority of them 
do want to have “worthy” life not the life that is only based on simple pleasures. A lot 
of them are dissatisfied that they cannot achieve their long-term goals. So, they 
succumb to various temptations instead. Due to economics, we know that human 
beings always must confront their values with environment and choose between them. 
However, this does not mean that choice explains everything. It is important to look 
deeper into our motivations and accept the fact that it is possible to have values and 
goals, but they cannot be so easily simplified to the utilitarian classifications. 
Robert Nozick (1974, pp. 42-45) presented a thought experiment which is 
known as The Experience Machine where the person’s brain is connected to some 
machine. Consequently, he/she sleeps and has a virtual and an extremely pleasant 
experience. Moreover, the subject would think that these pleasant experiences are the 
reality. Many people do not want this kind of life even if it is delightful. This rejection 
of a pleasant life is an argument against hedonism because it shows that people value 
other things more than pleasure. The animosity toward using only utilitarian 
measurement justifies the acknowledgment of a possibility that there are values other 
than only pleasantness or unpleasantness. 
 
4.1 Man in a Wider Perspective 
 
“To be able to choose the line of greatest advantage  
instead of yielding in the direction of least resistance.”  
 
George Bernard Shaw 
 
If we want to understand the incomparable distinction between human values and 
pleasures, we must look at a man or a woman not only when he or she makes a choice, 
but most notably before and after it. In order to do it, let us focus our attention on 
Read’s idea where he shows how human decisions vary over a period of time when 
they are made. He divided a person into pre-agent, acting-agent, and post-agent (Daniel 
Read 2006). Every of these “selves” differ from the other, and it is impossible to collate 
them as it was done by Becker. 
The first part of a human being is pre-agent. It is a planner who is very similar 
to the economic man. He/she is rational and always tries to choose the best option by 
calculating which option fulfills his/her long-term preferences. Pre-agent is focused on 
the future and treats present as a temporary condition which is not so important. 
Furthermore, he/she has some cognitive constraints, but this does not change the fact 
that pre-agent still tries to maximize his/her long-term preferences. Broadly speaking, 
we can identify pre-agent with reason. 
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Acting-agent is a different part of a human being. We should associate him/her 
with Freud’s conception of “id”. At the moment, we are like small children who want 
quick pleasures and by no means want pain. We are focused on present, and we do not 
pay any attention to the future. In general, we can identify acting-agent with emotions. 
The last conception is post-agent who evaluates his/her own choice, and this is 
something to what Becker did not pay enough attention. The most interesting case is 
when post-agent feels regret about the decisions that have been made by him/her. This 
situation is called regret theory (David Bell 1982; Graham Loomes and Robert Sugden 
1982). In this article, we are not interested in the situation when we get the new 
information and we recognize that our previous decision was not optimal. We are 
interested in the situation when the goals of pre-agent clashes with the goals of active-
agent. Most frequently, human beings feel regret about some decision made on the 
spur of the moment, when they succumb to the temptation and forget about their long-
distance goals. This conflict is best seen in the case of drugs when we have a clash 
between goals like health and short-term pleasures. In Becker and Murphy’s opinion, 
this problem does not exist. They write that:  
 
“The claims of some heavy drinkers and smokers that they want to but cannot end 
their addictions seem to us no different from the claims of single persons that they 
want to but are unable to marry or from the claims of disorganized persons that they 
want to become better organized. What these claims mean is that a person will make 
certain changes-for example, marry or stop smoking-when he finds a way to raise 
long-term benefits sufficiently above the short-term costs of adjustment” (Becker 
and Murphy 1988, p. 693).  
 
Becker is right to claim that seemingly irrational behavior as taking drugs can 
maximize utility. The question is if this understanding of rationality makes any sense. 
In the economic approach, ex-alcoholic who does not want to drink because he/she 
knows where it can take him/her is rational when he/she comes back to drinking. This 
human does not want to drink, but after going on a binge, he feels awful about his 
behavior. Is it possible to decide if the temporary need to relapse to alcohol is more 
important than the goals and human motivations? Becker assumes that human beings 
can integrate these conflicting motivations and bring them to a common denominator 
of utility. 
 
4.2 Schelling’s Dilemma 
 
Very often different psychologists depict Odysseus as an illustration of human’s 
conflict between the long-term goals and the short-term drives. He was supposed to 
float over the rocky islands that were inhabited by sirens. Their singing ensnares many 
sailors and consequently, they hit the rocks. Ulysses knew about sirens’ appeal and he 
decided to protect himself. In order to do it, he ordered some deckhands to tie him to 
the mast and to put wax in their ears. Because of these precautionary measures, they 
could not hear the sirens’ singing. The ship floated safely, and then Odysseus boasted 
that he heard the beautiful sirens’ singing. 
This behavior of mythical hero is known as “precommitment strategy”. People 
use this strategy of their own volition to remove options from which they choose 
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because they are afraid that they succumb to the temptations when the choice comes. 
For Schelling, this human ability was something really disturbing, in the context of 
neoclassical rationality, and he decided to inspect it (Schelling 1978, 1980, 1984a, b, 
1985, 1986). The choices between the long-term goals and the short-term pleasures are 
not simple anomalies, but they are an inherent quality of human beings. There are a lot 
of different situations, when we want to curb our freedom. Schelling presents many 
examples of this behavior:  
 
“Please do not give me a cigarette when I ask for it, or dessert, or a second drink. 
Do not give me my car keys. Do not lend me money. Do not lend me a gun. Besides 
denial there are interventions. Do not let me go back to sleep. Interrupt me if I get 
in an argument. Push me out of the plane when it’s my turn to parachute. Don’t let 
me go home drunk unless you can remove my children to a safe place. Blow the 
fuse if you catch me watching television. Make me get up and do my back exercises 
every morning” (Schelling 1984b, p. 1). 
 
The problem for Schelling is not that these situations exist. There is rather a 
question if the pre-agent should be more important than the active-agent, as it seemed 
to be at first sight. Schelling gives the example of Captain Ahab from Moby Dick, who 
lost his leg because of a bad wound: 
 
“The blacksmith enters with a hot iron to cauterize the stump. Ahab begs not to be 
burned. The crewmen hold him down as he spews out the apple in a scream, and 
steam rises where the iron is tormenting his leg. The movie resumes with Ahab out 
of pain and apparently glad to be alive” (Schelling 1984b, p. 9). 
 
At first, Schelling treats this example as a simple situation. We get a lot of utility 
in exchange for our limited freedom - life in exchange for short but a much intensified 
moment of pain. Later, however, he notes that even if Ahab asked smith to cauterize 
his wound and even if felt grateful for the operation which was conducted on him, it 
would not mean that this was the best decision which gave him the greatest utility. 
Schelling writes: “If you burn me so that I may live I’ll thank you, afterward, but that 
is because I’ll be feeling no pain and not anticipating any when I thank you” (Schelling 
1984b, p. 9). He concludes by saying:  
 
“How do we know whether an hour of extreme pain is more than life is worth? 
Alternatively, how do we know whether an hour of extreme pain is more than death 
is worth? The conclusion that I reach is that I do not know, not for you and not for 
me” (Schelling 1984b, p. 9). 
 
Schelling comes to the conclusion that it is impossible to assess which choice 
is better if we only take utility into an account. He claims that every moment is 
different, and it is impossible to compare different periods of time3. Thus, Schelling 
detected what Becker has also found. It is impossible to compare choices with respect 
to utility because utility is absolutely relative. These two Nobel Prize winners drew 
different conclusions from their knowledge. As far as Becker is concerned, he thought 
that if we cannot assess whether some actions give more utility than the other, then we 
 
3 Kahneman (2011) underlines an indispensible difference between experiencing self and remembering 
self. 
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must assume that a man/woman is rational and always does things that maximize 
his/her utility. If we did not assume that, then the whole conception of utilitarianism 
and utility will not have any sense. 
Schelling comes to another conclusion, probably because he was not so fierce 
utilitarianist like Becker and did not need to defend or to adjust a theory to reality. 
Therefore, he could be closer to reality, and he was not blinded by logic like Becker. 
Schelling thought that it is impossible to compare utility over time because: 
 
“Each self is a set of values; and though the selves share most of those values, on 
the particular issues on which they differ fundamentally there doesn’t seem to be 
any way to compare their utility increments and to determine which behavior 
maximizes their collective utility” (Schelling 1984b, p. 8).  
 
We cannot use utility measurements because human beings have two different 
selves, and they have diverse preferences. Thus, economics should handle these selves 
separately. Schelling did not want to decide which of these two selves are more 
important because we are not able to compare their utilities. However, this relativity is 
not a problem for Schelling because:  
 
“Sometimes, but not always, it is easy to know which is Dr. Jekyll and which is Mr. 
Hyde. The person who drinks and becomes vicious, or a bore, and is morose about 
it for days afterwards; the person who continually resolves to demand that increase 
in pay and never musters the courage; and the person who walks into a casino for a 
little sociable gambling, loses more than he intended, commits more to recover it, 
and emerges traumatized after blowing his bankroll, all seem to present an unequal 
pair, a ‘straight’ ego and a wayward alter” (Schelling 1984a, p. 61). 
 
However, Schelling was aware of the fact that he did not have a tool that would 
help him to decide which self is more important. “Anyone who is happily addicted to 
nicotine, benzedrine, valium, chocolate, heroin, or horse racing, and anyone unhappily 
addicted who would not elect the pains and deprivations of withdrawal, are not my 
subject” (Schelling 1984b, p. 4). However, he tried to make a small distinction that 
helped him to justify a choice:  
 
“I am not concerned with whether cigarettes or rich desserts are bad for you, only 
with the fact that there are people who wish so badly to avoid them that, if they 
could, they would put those commodities beyond their own reach” (Schelling 
1984b, pp. 4-5). 
 
Even though he did not want to choose, the last citation shows that in the end, 
he chose reason and the long-term man over a man focused at this moment. His small 
emphasis on people who succumb to temptations but who do not want this to happen 
made Schelling to have the same problem like Mill. Even if Schelling claims that it is 
impossible to compare utility in time, for him the real “I” is not the person who drinks 
but the self that regret this addiction. Thereby, Schelling a priori must assume that 
health, self-esteem, and so on have some value. We must now establish what these 
values mean, if we do not want to always credit human choices (consequences) as a 
reflection of our preferences. 
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4.3 Reason as a Human’s Master but Not Like the Sun King 
 
Schelling’s attempt to show inconsistency between what we do and what we “really” 
want is nowadays called second-order desire and was invented by philosopher 
Frankfurt:  
 
“Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that, men may also 
want to have (or not to have) certain desires and motives. We are capable of wanting 
to be different, in their preferences and purposes, from what they are” (Frankfurt 
1971, p. 7). 
 
The easiest way to explain this conception is by the example of drugs. Having 
the choice to take or not to take drugs, the person who is addicted will choose a drug, 
and this is his/her first-preference. However, if a person had a choice, he/she would 
rather rank his/her preferences as no drug > drug than drug > no drug. This ability is 
called second-order desires. We should not perceive the second-order desires as the 
instability of preferences. This is rather our preference ranking. We see attempts to 
broaden our preferences by meta-rankings (Sen 1977). 
Second-order theory does not polemicize with Hume’s thought that we cannot 
determine our preferences by reason (reason is the slave of passion). In the theory of 
second-order desires, people have defined preferences. However, due to reason, people 
can change their preferences, and categories of freedom are different than simple 
utility. This state only concerns pre-agent and post-agent because active-agent is 
focused on a particular action, and it does not have second-order desires. This 
condition, when we are tossed by our desires, is called “wanton” by Frankfurt. This 
state is right for both animals and children. In the second-order desires, the 
consequences are not sufficient. This is the reason why it is also important to get to 
know the deeper human motivations and goals. 
In this article, the second-order desires are understood as a kind of attempt to 
give authority to reason. It is taking a stance in a long-lived battle between reason and 
emotions as two adversarial selves in people4. I do not want to give the absolute power 
to reason as it was done by Kant. For whom preferences have not had any moral 
significance and for who human should behave in accordance with categorical 
imperative (identifies with reason). I appreciate a tremendous contribution of 
economics to show that human choices are relative. There is no need to create rules 
that do not stick to reality and to order human to be entirely subservient to reason. 
Human beings are also driven by emotions and pleasure principle; therefore, we cannot 
neglect this part of our nature. I give priority to reason only to provide humans with a 
possibility to assess their preferences and to judge their individual emotions.  
 
4.4 People Have Values 
 
It is also important to underline that preferences go beyond utilitarian measurement. 
Arrow defines them as “the values of individuals rather than to their tastes” (Arrow 
 
4 However, this perception now seems to be only a stylistic device because more and more data show that 
emotions and reason are strictly connected and their cooperation is essential in the process of making ra-
tional decisions (Antonio Damasio 2005). 
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1951, p. 23). Values are the core of human preferences and they form our goals and 
preferences especially in the long-run. Hechter describes them as “relatively general 
and durable internal criteria for evaluation” (Michael Hechter 1992, p. 215). 
Neoclassical economics wanted to save its utility maximization theory by 
putting values into the black box of utility. However, this way of thinking led to 
tautology and made economics insensitive to the differences in human motivations. 
Values are different from utility because they are ex-ante reason why we do something. 
In this instance, we do not use consequential thinking, and we do not calculate our 
utility. It is impossible to solve chicken or egg dilemma. It means that we cannot prove 
that humans are solely motivated by values and that they are not influenced by utility. 
However, there is no need to prove that values are something that exist ex-ante. I only 
want to show that values vary strongly from utility, and we cannot compare them. This 
difference is clearly visible if we analyze people’s attitudes toward concepts of values 
and utility. We can use neoclassicists’ line of argument that we give back wallet which 
we had found on the street because it is “economical” to give it back. Cherishing our 
self-respect, being a “good man” can be more important than money in this economic 
way of thinking because it gives us more utility. However, this reasoning looks only 
as an attempt to defend the homo economicus model. People understand the difference 
between self-interest (maximization of utility) and values in an intuitive way. In this 
example, we improve our situation when we leave money for ourselves. However, 
behaving according to the values (giving money back) seems to make our situation 
worse. This way of thinking is because people do not want to be “good” because this 
gives them some profit (utility). Moreover, they want to be “good” because being 
“good” has some intrinsic value independent of utility. Of course, this is only his/her 
declaration, but as I have shown earlier that declarations matter, and it is important to 
know them if we want to understand human behavior. In order to explain the difference 
between self-interest and values, it is useful to use the concepts of sympathy and 
commitment that were proposed by Sen: 
 
“The former corresponds to the case in which the concern for others directly affects 
one’s own welfare. If the knowledge of torture of others makes you sick, it is a case 
of sympathy; if it does not make you feel personally worse off, but you think it is 
wrong and you are ready to do something to stop it, it is a case of commitment” 
(Sen 1977, p. 326). 
 
Economists have an enormous problem to understand this difference. It is 
clearly visible when altruistic and self-interest motivations are put into the black box 
of utility. It means that economists do not have tools to notice the difference between 
these two distinctive motivations (both can maximize utility in a neoclassical theory). 
It causes that economists look at human behavior in a particular way. For almost 150 
years (marginal revolution in 1870) economists have assumed that human beings are 
predominantly driven by self-interest. This assumption together with methodological 
individualism is one of the cornerstones of modern economics. However, it has not 
always been like that. Adam Smith, the father of contemporary economics, perceived 
people in a complex way. The majority of economists only refer to “An Inquiry into 
the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations” (Adam Smith 1776) and they forget 
about “The Theory of Moral Sentiments” (Smith 1759) that had been written 16 years 
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before the “economic bible”. In this book, Adam Smith wrote about the “altruistic 
side” of human beings. He wrote about an impartial spectator, social norms, and 
sympathy. Smith considered himself as a moral philosopher but because of different 
reasons, his moral philosophy has been forgotten. One of these reasons is that Smith 
was used by many economists for their own purposes, and this has led to a situation 
where nowadays, the Scottish thinker is associated with self-interest and invisible hand 
(Aleksander Ostapiuk 2017). 
It is essential in which way Adam Smith is treated by mainstream economists 
because it tells us a lot about contemporary economics. It assumes that people are self-
interested; economics does not deal with people’s ends (value-free economics) and that 
people always maximize their utility (which can mean everything). Amitai Etzioni 
(1990) wrote an extensive book where he criticized the simplification of these 
assumptions. The purpose of this subchapter is less extensive. A few examples will be 
presented, and they should convince the readers that it is impossible not to distinguish 
between human motivations. 
To start with, we need to understand that neoclassical economics perceived self-
interest very broadly. This understanding of self-interest has been caused by the 
criticism of homo economicus. A lot of opponents of homo economicus ask why people 
donate their organs to those who they do not even know, why we give tips in a roadside 
restaurant, or why we give presents. Neoclassical economics had to expand the notion 
of self-interest to its extremes to answer the aforementioned questions. One anecdote 
about Hobbes can help us to understand how broadly self-interest is perceived by 
mainstream economics. 
Apparently, Hobbes was walking in London with a clergyman and suddenly 
they spotted a beggar. Hobbes gave alms to the beggar and this astonished the 
clergyman. He said: “You helped this poor man, so, your theory about an egoistic man 
has fallen down”. Hobbes responded: “No” and he added that: “It proves my point that 
I am an egoist because looking at this poor man makes me feel unhappy and when I 
gave him money I felt better”. In philosophy this approach is called psychological 
egoism, and it assumes that people always behave in accordance with their self-interest 
and even if they help and call it altruism it is only a disguise for their self-interest. 
Neoclassical economics has used this reasoning for many years. We can easily 
find an analogy with utility maximization. In psychological egoism, every behavior 
can be explained by an egoistic motivation. We just need to look for it deeper. The 
economic approach assumes that people always maximize their utility (we can 
perceive it ad libitum) and ex post we can consider every behavior as the result of 
utility maximization. Which implications does it have? For example, neoclassical 
economics cannot differentiate between the soldier who jumps on a grenade to save 
his comrades and the soldier who pushes another soldier on a grenade to save himself. 
This relativistic approach (value-free) together with the assumption of human being as 
a self-interest entity causes that economics looks at reality in a particular way. 
Now we can come back to the questions connected with donating organs to 
people that we do not know, giving tips on restaurant, or giving presents. The answer 
is simple: they do it because it gives them utility. Furthermore, people choose 
something because it gives them the most utility. According to the neoclassical 
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economics, if somebody donates their kidney to the stranger, it is only because it gives 
him utility. Becker understood that we have different motivations (love, envy, 
brotherhood). However, his approach does not notice this difference. People just 
maximize their own utility. So, it means that if I donate a kidney to some stranger, I 
will do it because it will give me utility (pleasure from being a good person). 
This broad perception of self-interest posed a lot of questions. It was Jean-
Jacques Rousseau who presented some arguments against psychological egoism and 
his argumentation can be used against the economic approach. If people can take their 
own interest and the interest of others into consideration (even if in the end they will 
behave in accordance with their self-interest), it means that people must be somehow 
connected with another people at least to the extent when the interest of others is 
depicted as an alternative to their own self-interest (Alasdair MacIntyre 1996, p. 186). 
The problem with neoclassical economics is that it solely focuses on the results of 
people’s actions. In the end, the feelings of love, friendship, and empathy give people 
pleasure (utility). However, the question arises if they are just the motivations for our 
actions or the results of them. Do people want happiness for their children because it 
gives happiness or if this happiness is the result of their love toward children? Do 
people give presents because giving presents make them happy or is it the result of the 
bonds with the other people? We do not need to answer these questions because as it 
was noticed by Rousseau, it is enough to incorporate others into our happiness to make 
the conception of egoism too broad (Ostapiuk 2017). 
This lack of interest in human motivations causes some problems that were not 
considered by Becker. He gives the example of a family where the wife’s behavior is 
transformed into the altruistic one due to self-interest (Becker 1974). In this example, 
the husband likes to read books in his bed before he sleeps. His wife does not like this 
because it disturbs her sleeping. However, the wife does not forbid him to read because 
she knows that a happy husband (in the higher level of utility) will compensate her 
“sacrifice” with interest. Her behavior is the same as the wife who really cares about 
her husband, but their motivations are different. What is most important here is that 
this husband prefers to be loved than not to be loved. He wishes that his wife permits 
him to read because it gives utility to him and not to her. It means that choice alone is 
not enough and that motivations do matter for people. 
Sen (1999, p. 75) is the most recognizable authority who shows that economics 
cannot focus only on the act of choice. The “background” is important as well. He 
gives the example of a man who is hungry. However, in the first case he is hungry 
because he does not have the food, whereas in the second case, he is hungry because 
of religious reasons (fast). Neoclassical economics cannot see the difference between 
these two behaviors because it is not interested in human motivations. It is only 
interested in choice alone. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Neoclassical economics does not want to deal with human declarations, values, and 
motivations; therefore, it assumes that people are always rational, and they always 
maximize their utility. In addition, it does not want to choose between two different 
selves. This deceptive “no choice” between selves causes that economics, in fact, has 
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an interest in the “short-term human” who is guided by pleasure-pain principle. 
Neoclassical economics does not want to know anything about human motivations; 
therefore, economists have more problems to predict human behaviors. However, the 
economic approach still exists because it can post factum answer every criticism of 
economic model. Neoclassical economists know very well about the tautological 
implications of their own method, but this method gives economics the first place over 
the other social sciences. Hence, they do not want to abandon this effective model. 
The assumption that human beings can choose the best option for themselves is 
nowadays treated as an absolute certainty in economic and social life. This absolute 
freedom given to human and the lack of rules on how to live results in people are more 
prone to short-term desires. That is why we have more obese people even though the 
majority of them do not want to be corpulent. There are billions of people who spend 
many hours watching TV every day, even if later they feel unhappy about it (Bruno S. 
Frey 2010, pp. 93-107). This value-free economics caused that people are not happier 
than they were in the past, despite tremendous economic growth. Scitovsky points out 
that economics should not only focus about GDP growth but it should also focus about 
how human can be happier (Tibor Scitovsky 1976). If this is its proper goal, economics 
sometimes cannot afford the luxury not to decide between human now and human over 
time. 
Economics should espouse for reason. It should go toward Sen’s capability ap-
proach which means the ability to achieve the kind of lives we have reason to value 
(Sen 1999, p. 18). Dismal science can be changed because no other science has so 
much knowledge about human rationality as it has. Furthermore, economics has a big 
insight into human irrationality due to various criticisms from psychology. Thus, eco-
nomics can use this knowledge to help people in their self-governance. It can also help 
to have a better life. Life that particular person wants to have. 
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